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INNOCENTS BEWARE: ON RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE NEGLIGENT
RETENTION OR HIRING OF CLERGY
Mark Strasser*
INTRODUCTION
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
includes a ministerial exception precluding the clergy from suing their religious em-
ployers for wrongful employment practices.2 The Court’s rationale for its holding was
rather robust in some respects and may have implications for a variety of cases in
which religious institutions are defendants. The decision is problematic not because
of the Court’s express decision to focus narrowly on the issue before it, but because
of the Court’s mischaracterization of past case law and its offering of so many mixed
signals that the treatment of related issues in the lower courts is almost guaranteed to
become even more chaotic.
Over the past several decades, state and federal courts have been forced to con-
sider the circumstances, if any, under which a religious organization might be held
civilly liable for the tortious conduct of clergy in their employ.3 There is a clear divide
separating the courts—some refuse to impose liability on the employers citing First
Amendment concerns whereas others see no First Amendment impediment to the
imposition of liability on religious institutions as long as the courts are applying
secular law and are not delving into religious matters.4 Regrettably, Hosanna-Tabor
does nothing to clarify the law in this area and, instead, will likely lead to even greater
confusion in the lower courts.
Part I of this Article discusses Hosanna-Tabor and the jurisprudence preceding
it, noting how the Court both has mischaracterized the past jurisprudence and has
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
2 Id. at 698.
3 See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219 (2000).
4 Compare, e.g., Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. 2002) (determining that “the
First Amendment d[oes] not bar claims for negligent hiring and supervision because the
claims constitute[ ] neutral principles of tort law that did not violate either the Free Exercise
Clause or the Establishment Clause” (citing Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364–65 (Fla.
2002))), with, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (determining
that “[i]t would . . . be inappropriate and unconstitutional for this court to determine after the
fact that ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised or retained the defendant”).
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planted the seeds for broad immunity for religious institutions. Part II discusses the
developing jurisprudence regarding negligent hiring and retention of clergy by reli-
gious institutions, discussing both the clear split within the lower courts and how
Hosanna-Tabor might affect the developing case law. This Article concludes that the
Court must both clarify existing law at its earliest opportunity and forestall some of
the broad interpretations that would otherwise result from some of the unfortunate
language in Hosanna-Tabor.
I. HOSANNA-TABOR
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the First Amendment protects religious
organizations in their choice of leaders.5 That conclusion was expected, both because
there is long and settled jurisprudence precluding civil courts from deciding religious
matters and because of the unanimity among the circuit courts that some kind of min-
isterial exception exists.6 Nonetheless, the decision is controversial in a number of
respects, including the Court’s analyses of who counts as a minister for purposes of
the exception, what sort of immunity is afforded by the exception, and why the ex-
ception even exists. While the implications of Hosanna-Tabor will not be clear until
future opinions are issued on related cases, the decision is likely to lead to increased
confusion in the lower courts in the short term and may lay the foundation for over-
broad immunity for religious institutions in the long term.
A. Hosanna-Tabor’s Recognition of the Ministerial Exception
Hosanna-Tabor involved a suit by a former fourth-grade teacher in a church
school,7 Cheryl Perich, who claimed to have been discriminated against in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).8 Perich had received religious training9
to become a “called” teacher,10 which entitled her to certain employment advantages.11
5 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 696.
6 See id. at 705 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of
a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such
legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution
and its ministers.”).
7 Id. at 700 (“Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at Hosanna-Tabor and
fourth grade during the 2003–2004 school year.”).
8 Id. at 701 (“Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
alleging that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990).”).
9 Id. at 707 (“Perich had to complete eight college-level courses in subjects including
biblical interpretation, church doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran teacher.”).
10 See id. at 699.
11 See id. (“A commissioned minister serves for an open-ended term; at Hosanna-Tabor,
a call could be rescinded only for cause and by a supermajority vote of the congregation.”);
id. at 699–700 (“At Hosanna-Tabor, [lay teachers] were appointed by the school board,
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The duties of a called teacher did not differ from those of a teacher who had not
been called.12
The Hosanna-Tabor Court cited a number of factors when determining that
Cheryl Perich was indeed a minister for constitutional purposes: she received religious
training to become a commissioned teacher and was afforded a formal title reflecting
that training;13 she held herself out as a minister, which entitled her to certain tax advan-
tages among other benefits;14 and she taught religious doctrine.15 In light of all of these
factors, the Court concluded that she was a minister for purposes of the exception, al-
though the Court declined to specify whether any of the enumerated factors was either
necessary or sufficient for that determination.16
Once making clear that Perich was a minister for First Amendment purposes, the
Court held that she was barred from bringing an employment discrimination claim
against her employer.17 The Court understood that its holding might have implications
for other kinds of suits but saved those issues for another day.18 Nonetheless, the ratio-
nales offered by the Court must be examined if only because they potentially provide
the basis for broad immunity for religious institutions.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court refused to give credence to the “remarkable view that
the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to
select its own ministers,”19 accepting that the Constitution protects the “internal gover-
nance of the church.”20 The Court noted that “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain
without a vote of the congregation, to one-year renewable terms. Although teachers at the
school generally performed the same duties regardless of whether they were lay or called, lay
teachers were hired only when called teachers were unavailable.”).
12 See id. at 700 (“[T]eachers at the school generally performed the same duties regardless
of whether they were lay or called . . . .”).
13 Id. at 707 (“Perich’s title as a minister reflected a significant degree of religious training
followed by a formal process of commissioning.”).
14 Id. at 707–08 (“Perich held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the for-
mal call to religious service, according to its terms. She did so in other ways as well. For
example, she claimed a special housing allowance on her taxes that was available only to em-
ployees earning their compensation ‘in the exercise of the ministry.’”).
15 Id. at 708 (“Perich’s job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and
carrying out its mission.”).
16 Id. (“In light of these considerations—the formal title given Perich by the Church, the
substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions
she performed for the Church—we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by the minis-
terial exception.”).
17 Id. at 709 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception, the
First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her reli-
gious employer.”).
18 Id. at 710 (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits,
including . . . tortious conduct by their religious employers.”).
19 Id. at 706.
20 Id.
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an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more
than a mere employment decision.”21 In addition, imposing sanctions on a church for
its termination of a minister’s employment “interferes with the internal governance of
the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will person-
ify its beliefs.”22 Such a result must be avoided as a constitutional matter. “By impos-
ing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects
a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”23
Not only are free exercise guarantees thereby abridged, but the Establishment Clause
is implicated as well. “According the state the power to determine which individuals
will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits gov-
ernment involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”24 Both of the Religion Clauses
preclude the State from forcing a church to hire or retain an individual to impart reli-
gious doctrine when doing so would result in the dissemination of a message of which
the church disapproves.25
B. The Case Law on the Freedom of the Church to Choose Its Own Leaders
When discussing the protections afforded to religious institutions, the Hosanna-
Tabor Court pointed to several cases discussing the conditions under which civil courts
could address legal issues involving religious institutions.26 The Court has long held
that civil courts cannot be the final arbiters of church doctrine or practice, and the
Hosanna-Tabor Court was not breaking new ground when suggesting that civil courts
cannot second-guess religious authorities with respect to what the religion requires,
permits, or prohibits.27
Consider the Court’s discussion of Watson v. Jones,28 which involved a dispute
between proslavery and antislavery factions in a Louisville church.29 The General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had recognized the antislavery faction,30 and the
Watson Court held that the civil court must defer to the Assembly’s determination:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these





25 Id. at 697.
26 See id. at 704–05.
27 See id.
28 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
29 Id. at 691–92; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (“[T]he Court considered a dis-
pute between antislavery and proslavery factions over who controlled the property of the Walnut
Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky.”).
30 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 692.
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tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them.31
Basically, the Watson Court suggests that it is beyond the ken of civil courts to decide
church doctrine.
Just as the civil courts do not have the expertise to make authoritative determi-
nations regarding religious doctrine, they also do not have the expertise to decide who
is best qualified to be the spiritual leader of a church. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America,32 the Court described Watson
as radiating “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from sec-
ular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”33 The
Kedroff Court explained that the “[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper
methods of choice are proven, . . . [has] federal constitutional protection as a part of the
free exercise of religion against state interference.”34 Thus, Kedroff explained, courts
are not only precluded from construing doctrine, but they are also precluded from de-
ciding who is best qualified to lead a church.
One additional case was cited by the Hosanna-Tabor Court to establish the degree
to which the civil courts must refrain from deciding church matters. In Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese for United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich,35 the Court
reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that a particular religious organi-
zation had violated its own procedures and constitutional guarantees.36 While the then-
existing case law had left an opening for civil courts to decide religious matters in cases
“challenging decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals as products of ‘fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness,’”37 the Milivojevich Court clarified that there is “no ‘arbitrariness’
exception—in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations.”38 Instead,
“civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious
31 Id. at 727.
32 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
33 Id. at 116; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (citing this Kedroff interpretation
of Watson).
34 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (footnote omitted).
35 426 U.S. 696 (1976); see Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (discussing Milivojevich).
36 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708 (“The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme
Court is that it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesias-
tical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes
its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.”).
37 See id. at 712; see also Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1,
16 (1929) (“In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted
in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so
by contract or otherwise.”).
38 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
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organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”39 Thus, the Milivojevich Court rejected that a
civil court could in effect reverse or overrule an “arbitrary” decision of a religious tribu-
nal, which is what the Illinois Supreme Court had done.40 However, the Milivojevich
Court left open “whether or not there is room for ‘marginal civil court review’ under
the narrow rubrics of ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals act in bad faith for
secular purposes.”41
Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich all limited the power of civil courts to second-
guess the determinations of religious authorities on religious matters, although leaving
open whether there might be some circumstances where “marginal civil court review”42
might still be warranted. Up until Hosanna-Tabor, the Court had tried to offer a nu-
anced approach, precluding courts from deciding almost all religious matters but
leaving open the role of courts in secular matters involving a clergyperson.43 The
Hosanna-Tabor Court eschewed the approach suggesting that religious courts should
decide religious matters and civil courts should decide civil matters, writing:
The purpose of the [ministerial] exception is not to safeguard a
church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a reli-
gious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to se-
lect and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly
ecclesiastical,”—is the church’s alone.44
But neither the exception nor its purpose had ever before been so described by the
Court,45 so the Court’s announcing of a possibly robust immunity from secular law
in this area was at least surprising. While it is correct to point out that the Hosanna-
Tabor decision was limited in that it only dealt with employment matters involving
ministers,46 it has implications that are potentially much broader.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 712 (discussing “[t]he conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court that the deci-
sions of the Mother Church were ‘arbitrary’”).
41 Id. at 713; see also Lisa J. Kelty, Note, Malicki v. Doe: The Constitutionality of Negligent
Hiring and Supervision Claims, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (2004) (discussing “the fraud
/collusion exception to the normal rule that neither secular courts nor states should become in-
volved in the clergy selection process of religious groups”).
42 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
43 See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy
Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV 431 (2011) (discussing that
before Hosanna-Tabor, the question about church autonomy was not fully closed).
44 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012)
(citing Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94,
119 (1952)).
45 See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 43, at 451–53.
46 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The case before us is an employment discrimination
suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we
hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.”).
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The Hosanna-Tabor Court discussed the constitutional harms that might occur
were a church forced to employ a minister whom that church did not wish to employ.
Those harms were not limited to those that might arise from the wrong person preach-
ing from the pulpit, e.g., an incorrect representation of church doctrine, but included
other harms as well that could not simply be avoided by refusing to afford the indi-
vidual pulpit access.47
The Court noted that Perich no longer sought to return to her former position.48
However, she did seek “frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees,”49 i.e., compensation for the discriminatory treat-
ment that she claimed to have suffered. But an “award of such relief would operate as
a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less
prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination.”50 The
Court explained that such “relief would depend on a determination that Hosanna-Tabor
was wrong to have relieved Perich of her position, and it is precisely such a ruling that
is barred by the ministerial exception.”51 According to the Hosanna-Tabor Court, the
ministerial exception when successfully invoked precludes a civil court from making
a determination that a religious institution violated civil law with respect to a
minister working there, at least insofar as the person’s conditions of employment
were concerned.52
Here, the Court was expanding the limitations previously recognized. While the ex-
isting jurisprudence had established that civil courts could not make a determination
that a church had chosen the wrong leader,53 e.g., because that leader allegedly had a
mistaken doctrinal view or because the church had not followed its own bylaws or tradi-
tions in the selection, the Court had never suggested that a civil court would be pre-
cluded from finding that a church had not acted in accord with civil laws when hiring
or firing someone. Indeed, the Kedroff Court had qualified the freedom of the church
to choose clergy by saying that the civil courts could not disturb such choices “where
no improper methods of choice are proven,”54 and the Milivojevich Court had left open
whether a civil court could find that religious authorities had committed fraud or had
improperly colluded to deny someone her rights.55 But these qualifications suggest that
47 See id. at 706.




51 Id. at 698.
52 Because the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, the religious institution that
fails to invoke it may lose its protections. See id. at 709 n.4 (“[T]he exception operates as an
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”).
53 See Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1929).
54 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952).
55 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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civil courts might have some role to play in certain kinds of cases involving church
leadership disputes. Admittedly, neither the Kedroff Court nor the Hosanna-Tabor
Court56 provided much help with respect to how such improper methods might be
proven or what the civil court would be permitted to do if the necessary predicate were
established. Further, the Milivojevich Court did not discuss the conditions under which
a civil court would be permitted to explore whether a fraud had been committed.57
Nonetheless, the previous decisions left open whether civil courts might have some role
to play in leadership disputes, whereas the Hosanna-Tabor Court was implying that
civil courts are precluded from deciding purely secular matters in light of secular laws.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court understood that Employment Division v. Smith58 might
seem to militate against the recognition of a ministerial exception, because the “right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or pre-
scribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”59 Further, the Court ac-
knowledged that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)60 “is a valid and neutral
law of general applicability.”61 However, the Court reasoned, the religious use of peyote
at issue in Smith was distinguishable from the alleged retaliatory treatment at issue in
Hosanna-Tabor.62 The former merely “involved government regulation of only outward
physical acts.”63 In contrast, the latter “concerns government interference with an in-
ternal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”64
There was some irony in the Court’s distinguishing between the two cases in this
way. In Smith, Oregon was criminalizing what everyone agreed was a sincere religious
practice,65 whereas Hosanna-Tabor allegedly involved an employment termination for
non-religious reasons.66 It is at the very least surprising that the Free Exercise Clause
would protect the allegedly non-religious action over the clearly religious one, espe-
cially when there was no evidence that the latter had caused any harm.67 Further,
56 The Hosanna-Tabor Court cited the Kedroff improper methods passage with approval.
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (citing Kendroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
57 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713
(1976).
58 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
59 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 43, at 445 (“Smith decided that the
Free Exercise Clause did not require a state to excuse religious believers from a religiously
neutral law of general applicability, specifically a criminal prohibition on the use of con-
trolled substances.”).
60 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
61 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877).
65 See id. at 706 (noting that “the peyote had been ingested for sacramental purposes”).
66 See id. at 700–01 (describing the circumstances of Perich’s termination).
67 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 911–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The State proclaims an
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suppose that the government were to criminalize the “sacramental use of bread and
wine.”68 Presumably, many would object to a characterization of such a government
action as merely involving “government regulation of only outward physical acts.”69
They would instead suggest that the State was regulating something of great religious
importance.70 By the same token, the sacramental use of peyote also should not have
been characterized as merely as an outward physical act.
An additional difficulty posed by Hosanna-Tabor is the Court’s suggestion that a
damage award to Perich was precluded because such an award would mean that the
Church had made a mistake.71 That same rationale might be employed to preclude an
award against a church that had refused to fire a minister who was known to harm inno-
cent individuals,72 because such an award would also be predicated on a determina-
tion that a church had made a mistake with respect to its decision to retain a particular
minister. The issue of whether churches can be held liable for their reckless or negli-
gent supervision or retention of clergy has arisen in several jurisdictions and the courts
have been unable to reach a consensus about how such cases should be handled.
II. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The ministerial exception bars an individual classified as a minister for First
Amendment purposes from suing her religious employer for employment discrim-
ination.73 As Hosanna-Tabor illustrates, that exception is triggered when an individual
meets general conditions.74 However, a separate issue involves the conditions, if any,
interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs.
It offers, however, no evidence that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed anyone.”).
68 Id. at 877.
69 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
70 Cf. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1964) (“Although peyote serves as a
sacramental symbol similar to bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than
a sacrament.”).
71 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (“An award of such relief would operate as a
penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited
by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination.”).
72 See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 43, at 452 (noting that the Hosanna-Tabor “decision
rested on broad principles of church autonomy over internal religious affairs—principles that
the Court said arise from both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses”); see also id.
at 471 (suggesting that the reasons that negligent retention suits are permitted involves a “lack
of understanding about the church autonomy doctrine and its effects on the correct application
of common law tort doctrines”).
73 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2153 (2013) (“[A] ‘ministerial exception’ ap-
plies to job discrimination claims on the ground that a church must possess the freedom to
select those who will carry out its mission.”).
74 The Court has noted that “the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious
congregation,” but has declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee quali-
fies as a minister.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
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under which a religious institution can be sued for tortious harms caused by one of its
employees, and courts have split as to whether the First Amendment precludes suits
against religious institutions for the tortious conduct of their ministers.
A. The Church Autonomy Doctrine
The Court has long recognized that churches have autonomy to make certain deci-
sions. Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich all speak to respects in which civil courts
are simply not competent to decide doctrinal matters.75 For example, it should neither
be alarming nor even surprising that civil courts should refrain from entering into dis-
putes about the authoritative construction of religious texts.76 As Milivojevich illustrates,
even attempts by civil courts to offer authoritative interpretations of religious procedural
guarantees is inappropriate—while judges are, of course, trained to read texts, they may
nonetheless lack the requisite understanding and appreciation of church precedent and
may not be able to judge which conflicting testimony should be given more weight.77
Merely because courts cannot offer authoritative judgments about church doctrine
or procedure does not mean that church practices are immune from civil review. Indeed,
religious practices are sometimes criminalized. For example, the Smith Court upheld
the criminal prosecution of the sacramental use of peyote.78 Further, the Court upheld
the criminal prosecution of polygamy in Reynolds v. United States,79 a case still cited
with approval.80
The Court has been willing to enter the fray even when criminal laws are not at
issue. In Bouldin v. Alexander,81 the Court held that one faction of a church had im-
properly removed a competing (majority) faction from membership.82 In a few dif-
ferent cases involving challenges to ownership of church property, the Court used
“neutral principles of law” to resolve the dispute.83
75 See supra Part I.B.
76 See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (“[C]ourts must not be-
come embroiled in disputes involving a religious organization if the court would be required to
interpret or weigh church doctrine.”).
77 Cf. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
718 (1996) (criticizing a civil court for having “evaluated conflicting testimony concerning
internal church procedures and [having] rejected the interpretations of relevant procedural pro-
visions by the Mother Church’s highest tribunals”).
78 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (“Because respondents’ ingestion
of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law . . . Oregon may, consistent with Free Exercise
Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use
of the drug.”).
79 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
80 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
535 (1993).
81 82 U.S. 131 (1872).
82 See id. at 140 (“An expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void act.”).
83 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“[A] State is constitutionally entitled to
adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.”); Md.
& Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370
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Writing as a Circuit Justice, then-Justice Rehnquist offered his understanding of
the limitations on the civil courts when deciding disputes involving religious parties.
He noted that there “are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil court
may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in adju-
dicating intrachurch disputes,”84 but rejected that “those constraints similarly apply out-
side the context of such intraorganization disputes.”85 Basically, civil courts must shy
away from deciding doctrinal matters because of “a perceived danger that in resolving
intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in essentially religious controver-
sies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.”86 However,
“[s]uch considerations are not applicable to purely secular disputes between third par-
ties and a particular defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud,
breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged.”87 Thus, while courts must not
decide doctrine, they are not precluded from applying secular law to resolve disagree-
ments that cannot be characterized as intrachurch disputes.
B. Suing the Clergy and Religious Institutions
For decades, both state and federal courts have debated the conditions under which
neutral principles of law should govern when a religious institution is a defendant. The
focus here will involve two different kinds of scenarios in which a plaintiff might sue
a church for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. One kind of case involves a
suit where an employed minister allegedly had sexual relations with an adult plaintiff,
whereas the other kind of case involves an employed minister who allegedly had
sexual relations with a child.
1. Cases Involving Alleged Victimization of Adults
Over thirty years ago, the Colorado Supreme Court in Destefano v. Grabrian88
was asked to decide whether a priest was immune from suit for allegedly having
engaged in sexual relations with a woman receiving marriage counseling from him.89
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“‘[N]eutral principles of law, developed for use in all prop-
erty disputes,’ provide another means for resolving litigation over religious property.” (citation
omitted)) ; Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]here are neutral principles of law, developed for use
in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property
is awarded.”).
84 Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. of United Methodist Church v. Superior Court, 439 U.S.
1355, 1372 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can.
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1996)).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1373 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709–10).
87 Id. at 1369.
88 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
89 Id. at 283 (“The threshold issue that we must first resolve is whether a member of the
clergy, who holds himself out as being trained and capable of conducting marital counseling,
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The court held that a fiduciary relationship had been established between the priest
and the counselee90 and that the counselor had a duty to refrain from engaging in con-
duct that might harm his client’s marriage.91 The court refused to recognize a sepa-
rate action for “clergy malpractice,” at least in part, because the recognition of such a
tort “raises serious first amendment issues.”92
A separate question was whether the Diocese could also be liable for the coun-
selor’s tortious behavior.93 The Destefano court rejected the counselee’s claim for vicar-
ious liability, because a priest’s engaging in “sexual intercourse with a parishioner . . .
is not part of the priest’s duties nor customary within the business of the church.”94
Indeed, a “priest’s violation of his vow of celibacy is contrary to the instructions and
doctrines of the Catholic church.”95 However, the court suggested that the Diocese
might “be directly liable for negligently supervising [the counselor]”96 if the necessary
predicate could be established and the employer knew or should have known that the
counselor would likely cause harm.97
is immune from any liability for harm caused by his counseling by virtue of the first amend-
ment [sic].”).
90 Id. at 284 (“We have no difficulty in finding that Grabrian, as a marriage counselor to
Robert and Edna, owed a fiduciary duty to Edna.”).
91 Id. (“As a fiduciary, he was obligated not to engage in conduct which might harm the
Destefanos’ relationship. If the allegations are true, it is clear to us that Grabrian breached his
duty and obligation when he had sexual intercourse with Edna.”); see also Sanders v. Casa
View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The First Amendment difficulties
posed by a claim for clergy malpractice are not, however, present in this case because the du-
ties underlying the plaintiffs’ claims for malpractice by a marriage counselor and breach of
fiduciary duties are not derived from religious doctrine. That is, because the jury found that
Baucum held himself out as possessing the education and experience of a professional mar-
riage counselor, his counseling activities with the plaintiffs were judged, not by a standard of
care defined by religious teachings, but by a professional standard of care developed through
expert testimony describing what a reasonably prudent counselor would have done under the
same or similar circumstances.”); Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
649 N.W.2d 426, 441 (Minn. 2002) (“[A]pplying neutral statutory principles that do not re-
quire any reference to or assessment of a religious component, the court could conclude that
Rideout was acting as an unlicensed mental health practitioner, and the court or jury can deter-
mine whether he violated the standards of conduct set forth in section 148B.68.”).
92 Destefano, 763 P.2d at 285; see also Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,
705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[A]ny attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parish-
ioner fosters ‘excessive entanglement with religion.’”).
93 See Destefano, 763 P.2d at 278 (including, as part of Plantiff’s complaint, the allega-
tion that the Diocese was liable as a matter of respondeat superior).
94 Id. at 287.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 289; see also Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Colo. 1993) (“Civil
actions against clergy members and their superiors that involve claims of a breach of fidu-
ciary duty, negligent hiring and supervision, and vicarious liability are actionable if they are
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That same year, the Ohio Supreme Court was confronted with somewhat similar
facts in Strock v. Pressnell.98 Richard Strock and his wife were experiencing marital
problems and consulted their minister, James Pressnell.99 The court began its analysis
by explaining that “the First Amendment has not been construed to create blanket tort
immunity for religious institutions or their clergy.”100 The court rejected that “the
sexual activities in which Pressnell is alleged to have participated are protected by the
Free Exercise Clause”101 and described “the alleged conduct—[as] nonreligious in
motivation”102 and as “a bizarre deviation from normal spiritual counseling practices of
ministers in the Lutheran Church.”103 Nonetheless, the court rejected a claim for clergy
malpractice104 as well as an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, because
permitting that cause of action under these circumstances would have allowed an
end-run around the State’s having abolished the torts of alienation of affections105
and criminal conversation.106 By the same token, because the husband was suing the
minister,107 the court refused to entertain a breach of fiduciary duty claim, reasoning
that permitting such a claim would also involve an end-run around the abolition of the
supported by competent evidence in the record.”) (citing Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284); Jones
by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“If, however, plaintiffs are
successful in establishing that, with knowledge that the priest was likely to commit sexual
abuse on youths with whom he was put in contact, his employers placed or continued him in
a setting in which such abuse occurred, the fact that the placement occurred in the course of
internal administration of the religious units does not preclude holding the institutions account-
able to the victim of their neglect in administration.”); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383,
387 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that the plaintiff’s “allegations, if proven, that Luther
Memorial employed and directed Christenson to counsel parishioners, failed to investigate
claims of his sexual misconduct, failed to remove him or to warn parishioners of his misuse
of his position and failed to supervise him adequately following his nervous breakdown or to
direct him to seek expert advice to deal with his abusive behavior would make it reasonable
for the jury to infer that it created the risk of harm to plaintiff”).
98 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988).
99 See id. at 1236.
100 Id. at 1237.
101 Id. at 1238.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1239 (“[C]lergy malpractice is not a tort theory that is viable under the facts
before us.”).
105 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 85 (9th ed. 2009) (“Alienation of affections. A tort
claim for willful or malicious interference with a marriage by third party, without justification
of excuse.”).
106 See Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1243 (“[W]e hold that the torts of alienation of affections
and criminal conversation, which were abolished by R.C. 2305.29, are not revived by the recog-
nition of the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 430 (9th ed. 2009) (“Criminal conversation. A tort action for adultery
brought by a husband against a third party who engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife.”).
107 Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1236 (“Appellant, who was subsequently divorced from his wife,
filed a lawsuit against both Pressnell and the church.”).
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heart balm causes of action.108 Because the court rejected all claims against Pressnell,
it also rejected that a cause of action could be maintained for negligent training
or supervision.109
While the Strock court dismissed the negligent supervision and retention claims
against the Church in this particular case, the court was not thereby erecting a bar to
the successful prosecution of such a cause of action in a case with different facts. In-
deed, in a later case, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that “if a church hires an indi-
vidual despite knowledge of prior improper behavior in his former church-related
employment, the church may be liable in tort for negligent hiring.”110 However, Ohio
has taken an unusual step in negligent hiring cases involving churches, requiring
“greater specificity in pleading . . . due to the myriad First Amendment problems which
accompany such a claim.”111 Thus, in Ohio, “in order to survive a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff bringing a negligent hiring claim must allege some fact indicating that the
religious institution knew or should have known of the employee’s criminal or tor-
tious propensities.”112
Courts have taken a variety of approaches to negligent hiring and retention suits
brought against churches. For example, some courts have held that the First Amend-
ment bars a negligent hiring claim,113 but does not bar a negligent supervision or
retention claim.114
108 See id. at 1241, 1243 (“For the same reasons that intentional infliction of emotional
distress was not a viable action in the case at bar, an action for breach of a fiduciary duty is
equally unwarranted.”).
109 Id. at 1244 (“[A]n underlying requirement in actions for negligent supervision and neg-
ligent training is that the employee is individually liable for a tort or guilty of a claimed wrong
against a third person, who then seeks recovery against the employer. Because no action can
be maintained against Pressnell in the instant case, it is obvious that any imputed actions against
the church are also untenable.”).
110 Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1991) (citing Bender v. First Church of the
Nazarene, 1989 WL 104765); see also Matthews v. Wittenberg Coll., 178 N.E.2d 526, 526–27
(Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
111 Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 589–90.
112 Id. at 590; see also Christopher L. Barbaruolo, Note, Malicki v. Doe: Defining a Split
of Authority Based on the State Tort Claims of Negligent Hiring and Supervision of Roman
Catholic Clergy and the First Amendment Conflict, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 457 (2003)
(suggesting that the Ohio heightened pleading requirement is a good compromise).
113 See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1150–51 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (“[A]ny
inquiry into the decision of who should be permitted to become or remain a priest necessarily
would involve prohibited excessive entanglement with religion. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims
of negligence predicated upon a ‘negligent hiring’ theory will be dismissed.”).
114 Id. at 1151 (“[T]he Court believes that, unlike in the case of hiring decisions, matters
pertaining to the supervision of Fathers Buser and Leifeld can be decided without deter-
mining questions of church law and policies. Therefore, the Court finds that no First
Amendment issues are implicated which would mandate dismissal of the negligent super-
vision claims.”).
2013] INNOCENTS BEWARE 191
Consider Vione v. Tewell,115 which involved a minister who had an affair with a
woman receiving marriage counseling from him. The court first examined whether the
minister was liable, noting that the minister’s “undertaking to act as marriage coun-
selor made him a fiduciary.”116 The minister was “in a position of trust, in which he had
a duty to act honestly and advise plaintiff in furtherance of plaintiff’s interest in pre-
serving his marriage, which was the object of the relationship.”117 Because of the fidu-
ciary nature of the relationship, this case was distinguishable from one “where a
minister engaged in a consensual sexual relationship while acting as a spiritual ad-
viser.”118 By making such a distinction, the court was limiting potential suits to those
individuals with whom the minister had a “special” relationship and not merely a
minister-congregant relationship.119
A separate issue was whether the Church might be liable for negligent retention
or supervision. The court reasoned that a “claim for negligent supervision or reten-
tion arises when an employer places an employee in a position to cause foreseeable
harm, harm which the injured party most probably would have been spared had the
employer taken reasonable care in supervising or retaining the employee.”120 Here, the
court was not suggesting that the employer would be strictly liable for the harm caused
by the employee. In addition, “[a]n essential element of these causes of action [is]
that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the
conduct that caused the injury.”121 In this case, it was at least alleged that “the Church
defendants knew, or should have known, of Tewell’s propensity to engage in harmful
conduct, but decided to look the other way.”122 Thus, because of the special relationship
115 820 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
116 Id. at 686.
117 Id.; see also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 43, at 466 (noting that “if a cleric holds
himself or herself out as qualified to give professional secular counseling, courts have found
that a fiduciary duty is owed when providing purely secular services”).
118 Vione, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
119 Cf. Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 2007 WL 161035, at *23
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he clergy-parishioner relationship alone is not sufficient to estab-
lish a fiduciary duty . . . . There must exist ‘something more,’ e.g., an additional or special
relationship, usually that arising from formal counseling.” (citing Ahern v. Kappalumakkel,
903 A.2d 266, 198–99, 270–71 (Conn. Ct. App. 2006))).
120 Vione, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (citing Sheila C. v. Povich, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342, 350 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004)).
121 Id. (citing Povich, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 350).
122 Id.; see also Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742, 760 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (“When
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could con-
clude that the Diocese, Sacred Heart and Bishop Timlin were negligent or reckless in super-
vising and retaining Liberatore.”); Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla. City, 188 P.3d 158,
173 (Okla. 2008) (“The Archdiocese’s argument that Father Imming’s alleged sexual abuse
was not foreseeable from the conduct that the Archdiocese had notice of presents an issue
that is dependent upon the inference made by the trier of fact concerning what a reasonably
prudent person would do in the circumstance of the defendant . . . . We accordingly reverse
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between the employee and the victim and because the Church was (allegedly) on
notice that harm would befall the victim, the Church might be held liable for not
having done more to prevent the harm.
In Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee,123 the Wisconsin Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the Archdiocese was potentially liable for a priest’s having forced himself
upon the plaintiff twenty-seven years before she brought her suit.124 The court found
her suit time-barred,125 but nonetheless decided to address the negligent hiring and
retention claim.126 The court explained that the “the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution prevents the courts of this state from determining what makes one
competent to serve as a Catholic priest since such a determination would require inter-
pretation of church canons and internal church policies and practices.”127
While the Pritzlaff court is correct that civil courts are unable to offer authorita-
tive interpretations of church canons, policies, and practices, the court was incorrect
insofar as it was implying that the civil courts would have to offer an interpretation of
doctrine when assessing whether the Church had been negligent. The Catholic Church
is of course permitted to ordain the individual in light of its own criteria. Liability only
arises if (1) what was alleged was accurate and the church knew or should have known
that the priest would, for example, likely subject teenage girls to nonconsensual sexual
relations,128 and (2) the church did too little to protect the young women who were
members of the Church.129 An Indiana appellate court explained in a case of alleged
child molestation130 that “review only requires the court to determine if the Church
Defendants knew of Henson’s inappropriate conduct, yet failed to protect third par-
ties from him.”131 In such an inquiry, the “court is simply applying secular standards
to secular conduct which is permissible under First Amendment standards.”132
the trial court’s summary judgment on Schovanec’s claim of negligent supervision and
retention . . . .”).
123 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995).
124 See id. at 782 (discussing “Ms. Pritzlaff’s allegation concerning Fr. Donovan despite the
passage of twenty-seven years since the end of the alleged relationship”).
125 See id. at 789 (“[W]e conclude that Ms. Pritzlaff’s claim is time barred . . . .”).
126 Id. (“We conclude that even if Ms. Pritzlaff’s claim were not time barred, it would still
fail to state a claim against the Archdiocese upon which relief could be granted.”).
127 Id. at 790.
128 See id. at 783.
129 Id.
130 See Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 452–53 (Ind. App. 1996) (“Katherine A.
Konkle . . . had been sexually molested by Floyd Henson, a minister of her church, since she
was seven years old.”).
131 Id. at 456.
132 Id.; see also Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1326–27 (Colo.
1996) (“Wolfe never presented the jury with a religious basis for his use of massage techniques
with counselees but rather explained his use of massage in terms of secular rationale . . . .
[T]he jury never had to consider whether Wolfe’s beliefs concerning the efficacy of touching
were grounded in his religious principles.”); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 851 (N.J. 2002)
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If courts are not precluded from applying secular standards to secular conduct even
when a religious institution is the defendant, then the religious institution’s decision-
making about who to hire or retain will likely be affected. For this reason, the Maine
Supreme Court rejected in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland133 that lia-
bility could be imposed against a church for negligent supervision of a priest who had
a sexual relationship with a woman whom he was providing marital counseling.134
The court reasoned that “the imposition of secular duties and liability on the church
as a ‘principal’ will infringe upon its right to determine the standards governing the
relationship between the church, its bishop, and the parish priest.”135 The Swanson
court concluded that:
[O]n the facts of this case, imposing a secular duty of supervision
on the church and enforcing that duty through civil liability would
restrict its freedom to interact with its clergy in the manner deemed
proper by ecclesiastical authorities and would not serve a societal
interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited.136
Regrettably, the Maine Supreme Court did not specify which facts of the case mili-
tated in favor of its holding. Courts as a general matter have been unwilling to recog-
nize a claim for clergy malpractice.137 Insofar as the court is following that line of cases
(“Although the church autonomy doctrine provides a shield against excessive government
incursion on internal church management, it clearly cannot be applied blindly to all disputes
involving church conduct or decisions. The doctrine is implicated only in those situations where
‘the alleged misconduct is “rooted in religious belief.”’” (citing Bryce v. Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002))).
133 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997).
134 Id. at 442 (“Mr. Swanson returned and indicated to Morin that his wife’s infatuation was
with the priest. Morin acknowledged that this seemed to be true. He told Mr. Swanson, however,
that he was trained to handle the situation and was ‘working with Mrs. Swanson on this issue.’
After this meeting, Mr. Swanson discovered the sexual relationship between Father Morin and
his wife. Mrs. Swanson then filed a complaint for divorce.”).
135 Id. at 445.
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[S]tate courts
have ‘rejected uniformly’ claims for ‘clergy malpractice.’” (citing Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d
1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., concurring))); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 2001) (“[C]ourts throughout the United States
have uniformly rejected claims for clergy malpractice under the First Amendment.” (citing
Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1432 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Coffey, J., concurring))); see also Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious
Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (2003) (“Courts have universally rejected claims of
clergy malpractice.”); Emily C. Short, Comment, Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on
the Parish? Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
183, 183 (2004) (“To date, no U.S. court has accepted clergy malpractice as a viable tort for fear
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when denying a claim for “negligent pastoral counseling,”138 the holding would not be
as robust as its language would indicate.139 However, there is reason to believe that
the Maine court was not merely rejecting a cause of action for clergy malpractice.
To see why that is so, it is helpful to consider some of the cases that the Swanson
court believed were wrongly decided. When noting that other courts had held that the
Constitution does not bar a claim for negligent supervision or retention in appropriate
circumstances,140 the court cited cases involving child molestation141 as well as non-
consensual sexual conduct with an adult parishioner,142 and then suggested that those
“courts have failed to maintain the appropriate degree of neutrality required by the
United States and Maine Constitutions.”143 Such a comment suggests that the court’s
focus was not on clergy malpractice, since those other decisions did not involve that
claim. Further, when citing to a case suggesting that secular interests were not suffi-
ciently important to justify overriding religious interests, the Swanson court cited to a
ministerial exception case.144 But ministerial exception cases may implicate issues in-
volving who best understands church doctrine that simply would not be involved in a
suit brought by an innocent third party against the church for negligent supervision of
one of its employees.145 Given the range of types of cases in which the Swanson court
believed that courts had failed to appreciate the kind of neutrality imposed on the state,
of problems with excessive governmental entanglement with religion or difficulty in defining an
appropriate standard of care.”).
138 Swanson, 692 A.2d at 442 (“Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court
seeking damages against Morin for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and
negligent pastoral counseling.”).
139 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court detailed some of the difficulties in recog-
nizing such a claim including describing the relevant standard of care. See F.G. v. MacDonell,
696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997).
140 Swanson, 692 A.2d at 445 (“We recognize that there is limited authority for permitting
negligent supervision claims to proceed when the plaintiff alleges that the defending church
knew that the individual clergyman was potentially dangerous.”) (citing Konkle v. Henson,
672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. App. 1996); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991)).
141 See Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d at 450–51; Jones by Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
142 See Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 584.
143 Swanson, 692 A.2d at 445.
144 Id. (“Although ‘[t]he Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the religion
clauses are subject to a balancing of interests test, the Court has also concluded that certain
civil rights protected in secular settings are not sufficiently compelling to overcome certain
religious interests.’” (citing Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,
894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
145 But see L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 447 (Wis. 1997) (holding that First
Amendment bars a negligent supervision claim regarding the actions of a hospital chaplain
for the same reason that such a claim would be barred for supervision of a priest, namely, that
the “claim would not involve consideration of neutral principles of law, [but] [i]nstead . . .
would require a court to interpret church law and policies, which would result in excessive
governmental entanglement with religion”).
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it is difficult to imagine what was allegedly so special about the facts of the case before
the court that drove the decision. Instead, it seems that the Swanson court believed that
“neutrality” required fairly robust immunity.
2. Cases Involving Alleged Victimization of Children
As a general matter, courts have been more willing to impose liability on churches
when they were on actual or constructive notice that ministers in their employ were
sexually abusing children.146 However, even in cases involving child molestation, courts
have sometimes refused to permit liability to be imposed against a church.
In Schmidt v. Bishop,147 a New York federal district court addressed whether a
church could be liable for the alleged sexual abuse of a child by a clergyman.148 The
court noted that “tort claims can be maintained against clergy, for such behavior as neg-
ligent operation of the Sunday School van, and other misconduct not within the purview
of the First Amendment, because unrelated to the religious efforts of a cleric.”149 How-
ever, because the case involved religious counseling, the court was unwilling to recog-
nize a cause of action for clergy malpractice, because such an analysis “would require
the court to define the standard of care of a reasonable clergy person.”150 Further,
courts in general have worried about possible difficulties in knowing where to draw
the line between permitted and prohibited conduct in a counseling setting.151
Yet, as the Schmidt court itself recognized, it would seem to require “no excessive
entanglement with religion to decide that reasonably prudent clergy of any sect do
not molest children.”152 Further, other courts have expressed confidence that they
146 See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
147 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
148 Id. at 324 (discussing contact between a bishop and a twelve-year-old girl, which “did
not involve rape or sexual intercourse, but essentially reflects the crime of sexual abuse in the
second degree”).
149 Id. at 327.
150 Enderle v. Trautman, 2001 WL 1820145, at *4 (D.N.D. 2001) (citing Schmidt, 779 F.
Supp. at 328).
151 See, e.g., Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 328 (“The difficulty is that this Court, and the
New York courts whose authority we exercise here, must consider not only this case, but the
next case to follow, and the ones after that, before we embrace the newly invented tort of
clergy malpractice.”).
152 Id.; see also Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
(“[A]lthough defendants persistently assert First Amendment protection, none makes any
suggestion that the alleged sexual misconduct of defendant Trane is a part of the tenets or
practices of the Roman Catholic Church, or that restraint on it by the imposition of civil lia-
bility will in any way intrude on the free exercise of religion to an extent protected by the
First Amendment.”); Marci A. Hamilton, The “Licentiousness” in Religious Organizations
and Why It Is Not Protected under Religious Liberty Constitutional Provisions, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 953, 956 (2010) (“Typically, the sexual abuse practices are not supported
by the religious beliefs of these organizations.”). It is precisely because religious groups are
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can impose liability against a member of the clergy for child molestation, and none-
theless “can provide a brake to the slide when needed”153 and thereby avoid “ven-
turing on a slippery slope into questions of liability impossible and unconstitutional
to determine.”154
Consider the pastor who negligently operates the Sunday school van. Suppose that
the pastor has several accidents. Presumably, the religious institution itself might be lia-
ble for permitting him to continue subjecting his passengers to harm if it took no steps
to prevent some of those harms, e.g., by arranging to have someone else drive the
van or, perhaps, by failing to warn parishioners about the dangerous driving habits of
the individual.
In Gibson v. Brewer,155 the Missouri Supreme Court offered a somewhat surprising
analysis of the conditions under which a religious organization might be liable for the
negligent actions of its employees. The court first noted that “[r]eligious organizations
are not immune from civil liability for the acts of their clergy,”156 explaining that “a
church can be vicariously liable for the negligent operation of a vehicle by a pastor in
the scope of employment.”157 However, the court distinguished between the liability
that would be imposed under the “doctrine of respondeat superior, [where] a principal
is liable for its agent’s acts that are (1) within the scope of employment and (2) done
as a means or for the purpose of doing the work assigned by the principal,”158 and lia-
bility because of negligent hiring and retention, which “necessarily involve interpreta-
tion of religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”159
Yet, it is not clear why a negligent retention claim must involve interpretation of
religious doctrine or administration. At issue in Gibson was whether the Diocese could
be held liable for a priest having taken inappropriate liberties with a child.160 After
not claiming that molestation is in accord with religious beliefs that it seems implausible to
believe that permitting liability will have disproportionate effects on certain religions over
others. For that claim, see Kelty, supra note 41, at 1141–42 (“[S]ince each denomination
holds its own distinct set of beliefs, this tort will disproportionately impact some religions
more than others, depending on which actions the court deems negligent.”). For those reli-
gious groups that would claim molestation is a religious practice, Prince v. Massachusetts
suggests that the religious claim will not win the day. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). For a dis-
cussion of Prince, see infra notes 214–17 and accompanying text.
153 Jones by Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
154 Id.
155 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997).
156 Id. at 246 (citing H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
157 Id. (citing Garber v. Scott, 525 S.W.2d 114, 119–20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).
158 Id. at 245–46 (citing Henderson v. Laclede Radio, Inc., 506 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Mo. Ct.
1974)).
159 Id. at 246–47.
160 Id. at 243 (“Father Brewer, a Catholic priest and an associate pastor, invited Michael
Gibson and a friend to spend the night and watch movies in the church Rectory. Michael
alleges that early in the morning, Brewer touched or fondled him in a sexual, offensive, and
unwelcome manner.”).
2013] INNOCENTS BEWARE 197
informing the Diocese of their concerns, the parents were told that “they should ‘forgive
and forget’ and get on with their lives.”161 The court noted that all parties agreed that
“intentional sexual misconduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not
within the scope of employment of a priest, and are in fact forbidden,”162 which was
why vicarious liability could not be imposed. But the court did not explain why reli-
gious doctrine, policy, and administration would be implicated were the Diocese poten-
tially liable for its failure to adequately supervise a priest with respect to his sexual
relations with children.
It might be argued that a diocese would be less likely to hire or more likely to fire
someone who was believed more likely to take advantage of innocent parishioners.
While that is true, the same might be said regarding a priest with an erratic driving
record. Further, the Gibson court distinguished between the negligent and intentional
failure to provide adequate supervision, reasoning that “[r]ecognizing the tort of inten-
tional failure to supervise clergy, in contrast, does not offend the First Amendment.”163
Yet, imposing liability for the intentional failure to provide adequate supervision
means that church hiring, supervision and retention of clergy might well be affected
by potential liability. This, too, would affect church administration.
The Gibson court implied that the Constitution precludes a state from punishing
a church for its failure to include a particular secular criterion within its ecclesiastical
hiring or retention criteria, namely, whether that individual is likely to abuse parish-
ioners, but the Constitution does not preclude a state from punishing a church for its
failure to include a different secular criterion within its ecclesiastical hiring or retention
criteria, namely, that the clergyperson is substantially certain to harm parishioners.164
Yet, no reason is offered to believe that the Constitution affords immunity to a church
for negligent but not intentional failures to adequately supervise employees, and the
same number of innocent people might be victimized in either kind of scenario.
Suppose that a church learns that particular priests have abused children and then
covers up those misdeeds.165 Suppose further that no steps are taken to assure that those
priests would either have no contact with children or would only have supervised con-
tact so that further harms would not occur.166 Would such a failure to adequately
161 Id.
162 Id. at 246 (citing Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ohio 1991)).
163 Id. at 248.
164 See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D.R.I. 1997) (“At the heart of these
cases are allegations that, during the 1970’s and early 1980’s, when the plaintiffs were minors,
they were sexually molested by the defendant priests. It is further alleged, inter alia, that prior
to such molestation, the hierarchy defendants knew that the priests were pedophiles and not
only failed to take appropriate preventative action, but also actively concealed the priests’
sexual misconduct.”).
166 Cf. id. at 78 (“[N]othing in those affidavits suggests that canon law precludes hier-
archical officials from taking appropriate action to prevent priests, who are known pedophiles,
from sexually abusing children. The affidavits make no reference to any limitation on the
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supervise be considered intentional or merely negligent? Some courts would charac-
terize the church’s behavior in such a scenario as an intentional failure to supervise
whereas others would characterize it as a negligent failure to supervise.167
While some express approval of the Gibson approach,168 it should be applauded by
no one, given the difficulties in determining what counts as an intentional rather than
negligent failure to supervise. Further, either might be claimed to intrude on the auton-
omy of the church with respect to its hiring and retention policies, and nothing in the
Constitution or the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that the difference between negligent
and intentional failure to supervise is where the line should be drawn when determining
whether a religious institution is potentially liable for its failure to afford adequate
supervision over its employees.169
At least one consideration that courts have included within their analyses of
whether neutral principles of law can be used to evaluate negligent supervision
claims is whether the challenged conduct is itself prohibited by law. For example,
a Connecticut court discussed whether a negligent supervision claim could be brought
in a case involving the allegation that a priest had “sexually abused, sexually assaulted
and sexually exploited the plaintiffs while they were minors.”170 The court expressed
Bishop’s power to determine a priest’s assignment or to closely monitor and supervise the
priest’s activities.”).
167 Compare Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 795
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“If, as the plaintiffs allege in their bill of particulars, the infant plain-
tiffs and/or Jimenez himself made statements to other priests at St. Leo’s Church or Our Lady
of Sorrows Church giving them notice of Jimenez’s conduct, the plaintiffs may have causes of
action sounding in negligent retention and negligent supervision.”), with Gibson, 952 S.W.2d
at 248 (“[T]he Gibsons have alleged that the Diocese knew that harm was certain or substan-
tially certain to result from its failure to supervise Brewer, and thus have stated a cause of action
for intentional failure to supervise clergy.”). Consider the test proposed by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity,
2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1789, 1866 (“We suggest that supervising officials be held liable only
when they fail to act on knowledge creating substantial grounds for concern that a member of
the clergy will use his position to commit sexual crime or to take sexual advantage of a member
of the faith.”). It is not clear whether the “substantial grounds” test would be better understood
as an intentional failure to supervise, a negligent failure to supervise, or somewhere in between.
They seem to be recommending a negligent supervision test that is more onerous than it would
be in other contexts. See id. at 1870–71.
168 See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 43, at 477 (“[T]he Missouri Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Gibson v. Brewer supplies a constitutionally sensitive approach by distinguishing be-
tween ordinary negligent supervision and intentional failure to supervise.”); Chopko, supra note
137, at 1119 (“[T]he framing of the supervision claim in the way least likely to engage a court
in an unconstitutional oversight of a religious entity is the ‘intentional failure to supervise’ cause
recognized in the Missouri courts.”).
169 Kelty, supra note 41, at 1151–54 (noting that intentional torts such as intentional failure
to supervise have only been recognized as constitutionally valid claims against churches by
state courts and lower federal courts).
170 Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 969 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1998).
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confidence that it could “apply neutral principles of tort law to conduct that is ex-
pressly prohibited by the laws of this state,”171 and explained that to “rule otherwise
would result in declaring the state and its inhabitants unable to seek redress when clergy
are accused of endangering the welfare and safety of minors, regardless of state law in
place to protect such minors from the very abuses alleged.”172 Were the Church afforded
immunity in this kind of case, the State would be putting it in a preferred position.173
Some courts do afford immunity to churches in these kinds of scenarios. In Ayon
v. Gourley,174 a federal district court examined the potential liability of an Archdiocese
when it had allegedly been expressly informed that a priest had sexually abused a
boy.175 The court explained that the “choice of individuals to serve as ministers is one
of the most fundamental rights belonging to a religious institution.”176 With respect to
the negligent supervision claim, the court believed that it would be necessary to delve
into the “unique relationship conceived by church doctrine.”177 The Ayon court did not
explain whether the same rationale would preclude claims based on “breach of a fidu-
ciary duty[ ] [or] negligent use of motor vehicles.”178 Either of these claims might also
171 Id. at 970. However, some states prohibit members of the clergy from having sexual rela-
tions with someone being counseled if that person is not a spouse. See, e.g., Olson v. First
Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing MINN. STAT.
§ 609.344(1)(l)(ii) (2000), which provides, in relevant part that “A person who engages in
sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree
if . . . the actor is . . . a member of the clergy, the complainant is not married to the actor,
and . . . the sexual penetration occurred during a period of time in which the complainant was
meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid
or comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is not a defense.”). The Minnesota court deter-
mined that the statute passed muster as long as the only issue for the court to determine was “the
limited issue of whether the existence of the relationship precludes the counselee’s consent
to sexual battery.” See id. at 263; see also James T. O’Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy
Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues,
7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31, 61 (1994) (“The courts recognize that the perpetrator’s power over
the victim can render consent legally impossible.”). With respect to the negligent retention claim,
the court reasoned that such a claim was not precluded because “[t]he inquiry is only into the
reasonableness of the employer’s supervision to prevent a cleric’s sexual penetration of per-
sons who are receiving ongoing, private spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from a cleric.” Olson,
661 N.W.2d at 265.
172 Rosado, 716 A.2d at 973.
173 See id. at 971 (“To hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious leader in a pre-
ferred position in our society.” (quoting Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336
(5th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
174 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998).
175 See id. at 1250.
176 Id.
177 Id. But see Mark E. Chopko, A Response to Timothy Lytton: More Conversation Is
Needed, 39 CONN. L. REV. 897, 900 (2007) (“No one could dispute that the crimes committed
by individual clerics created liability for those dioceses and religious orders whose leadership
knew of these activities beforehand.”).
178 See Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
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implicate religious views regarding the unique relationship between a church and its
minister and thus would seem beyond civil review, foreseeable harm to known indi-
viduals notwithstanding.
A North Carolina appellate court rejected that “resolution of the Plaintiffs’ negli-
gent retention and supervision claim requires the trial court to inquire into the Church
Defendants’ reasons for choosing Privette to serve as a minister.”179 If, instead, the
Church knew or had reason to know of the minister’s “propensity to engage in sexual
misconduct,”180 and that misconduct was not “part of the tenets or practices of the . . .
Church,”181 then the First Amendment would not bar the claim.182 The Church is per-
mitted to make its own decisions about who is most qualified to spread the religion’s
message, but that does not mean that the church is immune from liability when failing
to take reasonable steps to avoid the imposition of foreseeable harm.
In C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Yakima,183 the Washington Supreme
Court distinguished between the duties that might be owed to congregants as a general
matter and the duties that might be owed “where a ‘special relationship’ exists.”184
Where the victim and the defendant have such a special relationship, there may be
“a duty to protect the victim against foreseeable harms, including harms intention-
ally caused.”185
The court then examined whether “there is a special relationship between a church
and the children of its congregation that gives rise to a duty to protect the children
against foreseeable harms.”186 The congregants’ children are “delivered into the custody
and care of a church and its workers, whether it be on the premises for services and
Sunday school, or off the premises at church sponsored activities or youth camps.”187
179 Id. at 398.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.; see also J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589,
597–98 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“The standard used to determine negligent retention is based
on neutral principles of law. The court need not investigate the role of pastor within church hier-
archy or the nature of Dvorscak’s employment with the church in order to resolve a claim of neg-
ligent retention. The unfitness alleged is the secular act of sexually violating a parishioner, not
any alleged unfitness that relates to Dvorscak’s duties as a pastor. The court only need evaluate
what the church knew or should have known about Dvorscak’s propensity to sexually violate
parishioners with whom he was counseling, and, if there was such knowledge, whether the
church’s actions were reasonable considering the problem.”).
183 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999).
184 Id. at 273 (citing Nivens v. 7–11 Hoagy’s Corner, 943 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1997)).
185 Id. Had there been no finding of a special relationship, the court might have held that no
duty was triggered. See, e.g., Bouchard v. N.Y. Archdiocese, No. 04 Civ. 9978(CSH) 2006
WL 1375232, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Plaintiff’s allegations do not make out the existence of
any sort of special relationship between the Church Defendants and Plaintiff beyond that gen-
eral relationship between a church or religious body and a congregant. That general relationship
is insufficient in law to support the finding of a fiduciary duty.”).
186 C.J.C., 985 P.2d at 273–74.
187 Id. at 274.
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Because as “a matter of public policy, the protection of children is a high priority”188
and because in many respects churches are relevantly similar to schools,189 the court
concluded that “churches (and other religious organizations) [are] subject to the same
duties of reasonable care as would be imposed on any person or entity in selecting and
supervising their workers, or protecting vulnerable persons within their custody, so as
to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm.”190 A church is not immune from liability for
failing to protect those whom it has a duty to protect as “long as liability is predicated
on secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of church doctrine or reli-
gious beliefs . . . .”191 The court was thus able to limit the number of individuals to
whom a special duty was owed.
The Florida Supreme Court in Malicki v. Doe192 noted the conflict among the state
and federal courts with respect to whether religious institutions can be held liable for
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of clergy.193 At issue in Malicki were the
actions of Father Malicki, who had allegedly “‘fondled, molested, touched, abused,
188 Id.; see also Kelly W.G. Clark et al., Of Compelling Interest: The Intersection of
Religious Freedom and Civil Liability in the Portland Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 OR. L. REV.
481, 483 (2006) (“[W]hen a claim of religious liberty is balanced against the interests of society,
the ‘compelling interests’ of protecting children from sexual exploitation by trusted adults and
rendering justice override the claim of religious liberty.”) (footnote omitted). Courts have been
less sympathetic when the relationship was between adults and arguably consensual. See, e.g.,
Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“Stripped
of religious overtones, plaintiff essentially alleges that a person pursued her, an adult woman,
gained her trust, and eventually engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with her, albeit that
her consent was given when she was in a vulnerable position.”); S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 181
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (“The obvious distinction between this case and C.J.C. is that this case
involves allegations by an adult of sexual improprieties. In contrast, C.J.C. involved such impro-
prieties against children, a group protected by criminal statutes and other public policies.”); see
also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 167, at 1794 (“Because the public interest in clergy behavior is
weaker in cases involving consenting adults than in cases involving children, state intervention
in the affairs of religious organizations is harder to justify in the adult cases.”).
189 C.J.C., 985 P.2d at 274 (noting that in “many respects, the activities of a church, and the
corresponding duties legitimately imposed upon it, are similar to those of a school”); see also
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions to Protect Others:
Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 45 (2005) (“[A] reli-
gious institution with custody of children during a religious retreat would likely have a duty of
reasonable care to protect them from the tortious acts of a third party to the same extent that a
secular institution would. The same is true of the relationship between a religious school and
its students during school hours.”).
190 C.J.C., 985 P.2d at 274; see also John Doe (1) v. Archdiocese of Denver, 413 F. Supp. 2d
1187, 1193 (D. Colo. 2006) (“[R]easonable employers take reasonably prudent measures to
avoid child abuse by their employees, whether the venue of employment is a church, school,
or camp.”).
191 C.J.C., 985 P.2d at 277 (citing Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336
(5th Cir. 1998)).
192 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
193 Id. at 358–59.
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sexually assaulted and/or battered’ the minor and adult parishioners.”194 The Church
argued that it was not liable as a matter of law, “because the inquiry for negligent hir-
ing and supervision necessarily implicates church practices and doctrine.”195 Basically,
the argument was that “the First Amendment bars the tort claims at issue here be-
cause evaluating the ‘reasonableness’ of their decisions regarding the hiring or super-
vision of Malicki would excessively entangle the civil courts in the internal workings
of the church.”196
When arguing that the First Amendment barred the imposition of liability, the
Church was not claiming that “the underlying acts of its priest in committing sexual as-
sault and battery was [sic] governed by sincerely held religious beliefs or practices.”197
Nor did the Church claim that its failure “to exercise control over Malicki was be-
cause of sincerely held religious beliefs or practices.”198 Because there was no claim
that religious principles had in any way been compromised, the Malicki court concluded
that “the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated in this case because the conduct sought
to be regulated; that is, the Church Defendants’ alleged negligence in hiring and super-
vision is not rooted in religious belief.”199 Even were there “an ‘incidental effect of bur-
dening a particular religious practice,’”200 the court reasoned that the tort claim was “not
barred because it is based on neutral application of principles of tort law.”201 The appli-
cation of neutral tort principles gives “no greater or lesser deference to tortious con-
duct committed on third parties by religious organizations than . . . to tortious conduct
committed on third parties by non-religious entities.”202 The Malicki court implied that
its immunizing the Church from tort liability would “risk placing religious institutions
in a preferred position over secular institutions, a concept both foreign and hostile to the
First Amendment.”203 Thus, not only do the Religion Clauses not immunize a church
from liability for the foreseeable tortious behavior of their employees, but those Clauses
arguably preclude a state from extending such immunity.
In Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison,204 the Mississippi Supreme
Court explained why it rejected that the First Amendment precluded tort liability on the
basis of negligent hiring or retention, noting that the “Diocese may ordain whomever
it concludes is worthy, and it may engage in whatever religious speech it desires.”205
194 Id. at 353.
195 Id. at 360.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 360–61.
198 Id. at 361.
199 Id.




203 Id. at 365.
204 905 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 2005).
205 Id. at 1222.
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However, “if it has specific knowledge that children within its care are in danger of
sexual molestation, and if it has the authority, power and ability to protect those chil-
dren from that known danger of abuse and molestation, it is for a jury to determine
whether it took reasonable steps to protect the children.”206 The court noted that the
Diocese would not be protected were it to allow a priest to drive the Sunday school van
when it knew that he would be a danger on the roads, e.g., because of the medication
he was taking,207 when the “diocese [c]ould simply prevent the priest from driving an
automobile under the circumstances.”208
If the Mississippi Supreme Court were to accept that the First Amendment imposed
the limitations suggested by the Diocese, then the court would have to accept that reli-
gious doctrine and practice could “impose or suggest different requirements for the pro-
tection of children from sexual molestation, than the requirements generally imposed
by society,”209 and that such practices were immunized from liability. The court could
not countenance such a result.210 One need only consider Prince v. Massachusetts211 to
see that the State is not required to stand by and allow children to be harmed, because
“neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”212 The Prince
Court pointed out that with respect to legislation designed to prevent harm to children,
“[i]t is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils
is within the state’s police power, whether against the parents claim to control of the
child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.”213
206 Id.
207 Id. (“[W]ere a hypothetical diocese to allow a hypothetical priest to drive an automobile
belonging to the diocese, knowing the priest had taken medication which severely hampered his
ability to drive safely, we doubt any serious argument could be made that the diocese was im-
mune from civil liability to an innocent person injured by the priest in an automobile accident.”);
see also Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First
Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1986) (discussing tort claims “arising out
of automobile accidents by persons on church business . . . for which churches have rightly been
liable since the abandonment of the charitable immunity defense”).
208 Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1222.
209 Id. at 1229–30; see also Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vt., 987 A.2d
960, 974 (Vt. 2009) (“Common law, not ecclesiastical principles, establishes the scope of that
duty. The duty owed by defendant to protect minors from sexual abuse is not different from the
duty owed by other institutions to which the common law applies. We find that there was no ex-
cessive entanglement, and thus, no violation of the Establishment Clause.”).
210 Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1229–30; Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called
Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 225, 237 (2007) (“If church autonomy is at its strongest when everything occurs inter-
nally, then what is meant by church autonomy is immunity from tort and criminal law when the
religious organization is involved in hiding criminal activity from the authorities and its own
members, whose children are at risk . . . . It turns the First Amendment into a shield for the most
heinous of behaviors, as it perpetuates the unacceptable behavior.”).
211 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
212 Id. at 166.
213 Id. at 168–69.
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Certainly, it is fair to suggest that imposing such a requirement adds a secular ele-
ment to the organization’s religious criteria. But it is not as if that secular standard
would supplant all of the religious requirements; instead, it would be an add-on and
thus does not seem to impose the kind of difficulty that some allege.214
In Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis,215 the Tennessee Supreme
Court addressed the validity of a tort action brought by Norman Redwing who claimed
to have been abused as a boy by Father Guthrie.216 Alleging that “the Diocese was
aware or should have been aware that Fr. Guthrie was ‘a dangerous sexual predator
with a depraved sexual interest in young boys’ and that the Diocese misled him and his
family regarding its ‘knowledge of Father Guthrie’s history and propensity for com-
mitting sexual abuse upon minors,’”217 Redwing sued the Diocese for its negligence
“with regard to the hiring, retention, and supervision of Fr. Guthrie.”218 Rejecting the
Diocese’s claims that Tennessee civil courts lacked “subject matter jurisdiction over
Mr. Redwing’s negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims, as well as his breach
of fiduciary duty claims,”219 the Tennessee court explained that civil courts are not
barred from adjudicating “matters involving religious institutions, as long as the court
can resolve the dispute by applying neutral legal principles and is not required to em-
ploy or rely on religious doctrine to adjudicate the matter.”220 Because the Diocese
had “not asserted any religious foundation for the alleged conduct upon which Mr.
Redwing’s claims are based,”221 and, on the contrary, had asserted that “any such
actions would be directly contrary to the beliefs, teachings, and principles of the
Roman Catholic Church,”222 the Tennessee court held that the Diocese’s defense was
unavailing.223 Basically, where a religious institution is on notice that its employed
214 See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 43, at 476 (“Defining that standard runs into the same
dilemma as in clergy malpractice: the alternatives are imposition of a uniform, state-created secu-
lar standard or a religion-specific spiritual standard. Either injects a court into the constitutionally
prohibited area of religious self-governance.”); Kelty, supra note 41, at 1123 (“[B]ecause
claims of negligent hiring and supervision require creating and applying a standard of care,
courts are forced to interpret religious doctrine and perhaps prefer the practices of one religion
over another.”).
215 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012).
216 Id. at 442 (“Mr. Redwing alleges that Fr. Guthrie began to take advantage of him. He
states that Fr. Guthrie began to touch him in inappropriate ways and eventually inveigled him
into a physical relationship that included oral sex.”).
217 Id. at 442–43.
218 Id. at 442.
219 Id. at 450.
220 Id. at 450–51 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–07 (1979)).
221 Id. at 452.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 453 (“[B]ased on the record before us, it appears that Mr. Redwing will be able to
pursue his negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims without asking the trial court to
resolve any religious disputes or to rely on religious doctrine.”).
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ministers are likely to violate their religious beliefs and practices by molesting chil-
dren, the institution is not afforded immunity from tort liability merely because it is
a religious entity.
C. Hosanna-Tabor and Institutional Liability
Hosanna-Tabor was decided in 2012, and it is too early to tell whether that decision
will have implications for the way that courts decide cases involving church liability for
the tortious behavior of their ministerial employees. A further complicating factor is
that, prior to Hosanna-Tabor, some courts had already held that religious institutions
were not liable for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of their employees,224 so
a court now issuing such a holding might be doing so because that was the governing
precedent in the jurisdiction rather than because of Hosanna-Tabor’s reasoning or
result. Nonetheless, there is reason to think that courts might read Hosanna-Tabor
as offering more robust constitutional protection than had previously been thought
to exist.
Consider Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church,225 which involved a church
elder’s claim against a church for negligent supervision and retention.226 Angela
Erdman was the Church’s “executive for stewardship.”227 In that capacity, she was re-
sponsible for “facilitating the development of vision, goals, and strategies for Chapel
Hill, providing strategic leadership, helping to make decisions regarding the financial
and development strategies and goals of Chapel Hill, and creating a major donor devel-
opment plan for Chapel Hill.”228 Ms. Erdman had expressly agreed “to be bound by the
disciplinary procedures of Chapel Hill and to seek reconciliation and resolve disputes
according to church procedure.”229
Ms. Erdman reported to the senior pastor, Dr. Toone, who was responsible for eval-
uating her work.230 Ms. Erdman was concerned that certain tours of “religious and his-
torical significance”231 led by Dr. Toone would jeopardize the Church’s tax-exempt
status.232 Toone assured her that the church was not at risk,233 but Erdman disagreed
with that assessment.234 Their disagreements escalated, culminating in Toone’s accusing
224 See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998); Swanson v.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997).
225 286 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2012).
226 See id. at 362.






233 Id. at 360–61.
234 Id.
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her of “insubordination” and “impugn[ing] his reputation”235 and Erdman’s accusing
Toone of attempting to intimidate her.236
Eventually, Erdman requested and was granted medical leave due to stress.237
While on leave, her attorney allegedly threatened to sue the Church if Erdman were
not offered an acceptable severance package.238 When her physician cleared her
to return to work, she was placed on administrative leave without pay while the
Church investigated matters.239 Eventually she was fired, allegedly based on Toone’s
recommendation.240
At least one question was whether Ms. Erdman was a minister for First Amendment
purposes, especially given that she had taken “ordination vows.”241 However, the trial
court refused to dismiss the cause of action on that basis, believing that it did not have
sufficient information to decide whether Erdman was in fact a minister for purposes of
the exception.242 Instead, the trial court held “a civil court cannot consider claims sub-
mitted to a hierarchically organized church’s ecclesiastical tribunal . . . includ[ing] the
negligent retention and negligent supervision claims.”243 The intermediate appellate
court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the negligent supervision and retention
claims and the dismissal of the Title VII claim.244
The Washington Supreme Court noted that Hosanna-Tabor provides guidance as
to who qualifies as a minister and that the ministerial exception is applicable in Title
VII actions,245 but refused to find that “Ms. Erdman was a minister of the Church and
therefore subject to the constitutionally based ministerial exception.”246 The court in-
stead remanded the Title VII claim for further proceedings.247 The court then held that
“as a matter of law permitting the negligent retention and negligent supervision claims
to go forward violates [the Church’s] First Amendment right to select and supervise its
ministers and its First Amendment right, as part of a hierarchical religious organization,
to deference to decisions made by its ecclesiastical tribunals.”248
The court’s justification for that position was somewhat surprising. For example,
the court noted that a “religious organization must be able to choose and retain its






241 Id. at 360, 362.
242 Id. at 362 (“[T]he trial court determined that it lacked sufficient facts to decide whether
Ms. Erdman was herself a minister subject to the ‘ministerial exception’ to a Title VII suit and
declined to rule in the defendants’ favor on this claim.”).
243 Id.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 362–63.
246 Id. at 362.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 363.
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spiritual leaders,”249 which is of course correct.250 However, by implying that Erdman
was a spiritual leader whose retention was a matter best left to church discretion, the
court was suggesting that Erdman was a minister for First Amendment purposes,
which is exactly what the court refused to hold.
The Erdman court also suggested that the Church’s “highest ecclesiastical tribu-
nal’s decisions on issues of discipline, faith, and ecclesiastical law must be given defer-
ence by a civil court.”251 That, too, was correct, but Erdman’s claim that the Church was
liable for negligent hiring or retention was based on civil rather than church law—she
was not asking the civil court to offer an authoritative doctrinal interpretation but in-
stead was asking the court to apply secular law to a particular set of facts and determine
whether a tort had been committed.252
The Washington Supreme Court recognized that churches can be held liable for the
tortious acts of their ministers, citing with approval Gibson’s point that a church might
be liable for the negligent driving practices of its minister.253 “But claims of negligent
retention and supervision pose serious First Amendment concerns that often weigh
against allowing a tort claim to proceed in a civil court.”254 As support for the conten-
tion that serious First Amendment concerns are thereby implicated, the Erdman court
wrote: “As the Court’s analyses in Kedroff and Hosanna-Tabor indicate, negligent
retention and supervision claims implicate a religious organization’s First Amendment
right to select its clergy.”255 Yet, neither of those courts dealt with negligent retention
or supervision; indeed, the Hosanna-Tabor Court expressly stated: “We express no
view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees
alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”256
Hosanna-Tabor’s limitation on its own decision notwithstanding, the Erdman court
gave that decision a robust reading. Indeed, in summing up its position, the Washington
court wrote that “negligent supervision claims should not be permitted to go forward
because it is virtually impossible to adjudicate such claims without inquiring into ex-
isting church doctrines and beliefs in order to establish duty, the standard of care, and
what constitutes violation of the standard . . . .”257 Yet, courts need not do that at all.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998) (“[A religious orga-
nization’s] choice of individuals to serve as ministers is one of the most fundamental rights
belonging to a religious institution. It is one of the most important exercises of a church’s free-
dom from government control.”).
251 Erdman, 286 P.3d at 363.
252 See id. at 362.
253 See id. at 364 (“[T]he Missouri Supreme Court noted, a church . . . can be vicariously
liable for its pastor’s negligent operation of a vehicle while in the scope of employment.”) (citing
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997)).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
710 (2012).
257 Erdman, 286 P.3d at 367.
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They instead are using secular standards regarding duty, the standard of care, and when
the applicable standard had not been met.258
The Erdman court seemed to recognize that courts are only applying secular rules,
but then suggested that it is “problematic”259 when the State imposes “state-established
standards onto a religious organization after the fact without regard to the organization’s
religious doctrines, beliefs, and customs.”260 Yet, it is not as if the law is changing after
the fact—standard, long-established rules regarding negligent supervision are being
employed. Further, it is, of course, true that the State should not be taking into account
religious doctrines, beliefs, and customs when applying secular laws to allegedly tor-
tious practices, because taking those doctrines, beliefs, and customs into account might
well involve preferential treatment or excessive entanglement.
The Erdman court expressly rejected use of the “neutral principles of law”261 ap-
proach in this context, instead suggesting that “[a] civil court is not entitled to interfere
with or intervene in a church’s selection and supervision of its ministers . . . when civil
claims of negligent retention and supervision are asserted,”262 citing Hosanna-Tabor in
support of its rejection of the neutral principles approach.263 But Hosanna-Tabor had
not been addressing the potential liability of churches when their employed ministers
engaged in allegedly tortious activities; instead, Hosanna-Tabor was precluding min-
isters from suing their employers.264
Justice Chambers in his concurring and dissenting opinion explained that “the
First Amendment does not vest churches with immunity from criminal or tort lia-
bility,”265 for example, “no exercise of religious faith condones the sexual exploita-
tion of children.”266 Here, he was worried about the breadth of the Erdman opinion,
which he understood to be suggesting that “no claim of negligent retention or super-
vision, no matter how appalling the conduct, could ever go forward against a church
based on the misconduct of its clergy.”267 He noted that Hosanna-Tabor “neither con-
siders that proposition nor supports that conclusion.”268 Indeed, “Hosanna-Tabor con-
sidered whether the ministerial exception doctrine applied to bar a petitioner’s claims
because she herself was a minister; not because, as here, someone else was.”269 The im-
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706 (2012).




269 Id. at 375.
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purport to consider whether a tortfeasor’s ministerial status was relevant to whether a
civil claim may be pursued against a church for negligent retention and supervision.”270
Not only did Hosanna-Tabor not even consider the “neutral principles” of law
approach,271 but the Washington Supreme Court had already recognized that a negli-
gent retention or supervision claim against a church could proceed in child molestation
cases.272 Justice Chambers had this case in mind when chastising the majority for
having offered such a broad opinion.273
Justice Chambers was correct that Hosanna-Tabor did not address whether neutral
principles of law could be used in a case in which a church was sued for its negligence
in employing a minister who acted tortiously and the Court certainly should not be char-
acterized as having offered such a holding. However, some of the Hosanna-Tabor
Court’s broad language could be inferred to support such a position, and it remains to
be seen whether the Erdman court’s mistaken reading of the Hosanna-Tabor holding
has nonetheless captured its spirit.
CONCLUSION
Hosanna-Tabor recognized that the First Amendment incorporates a ministerial
exception that precludes ministers from suing their religious employers for allegedly
discriminatory employment practices. That decision overextended the past jurispru-
dence by holding that the First Amendment not only bars civil courts from offering
authoritative constructions of religious doctrines, procedures, and practices, but also
precludes courts from applying secular laws to religious institutions’ allegedly wrong-
ful employment practices. To make matters worse, the Court muddied the waters with
respect to who counts as a minister for purposes of the First Amendment, thereby
potentially exposing more individuals to wrongful employment practices without the
possibility of being afforded a remedy.
Hosanna-Tabor potentially creates yet another difficulty. By implying that the First
Amendment immunizes church selection of its ministers from tort liability because such
decisions are the church’s alone, the Court might be understood to be implying that
churches are immune from suit even when they knowingly employ individuals who are
270 Id.
271 Id. at 376 (“The lead opinion also suggests that the United States Supreme Court rejected
the neutral principles approach in Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694. Lead opinion at 368. That is
a remarkable reading of the text. Hosanna-Tabor never mentions ‘neutral principles.’ It does
not discuss the leading neutral principles cases, Jones, 443 U.S. 595 and Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440. Nor did it have any reason to.”).
272 See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic
Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1996)).
273 See Erdman, 286 P.3d at 373 (Chambers, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(“[W]e have already allowed cases against churches involving clergy sexual misconduct to go
forward.”) (citing C.J.C., 985 P.2d at 277).
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likely to commit tortious behavior. While there is no basis for such a position in the
jurisprudence preceding Hosanna-Tabor, and the Court expressly claimed to be limiting
its focus to employment actions brought by ministers, the Court’s careless use of lan-
guage makes such a reading possible. Such a holding is fearful to contemplate,
especially given the vast array of employees who might qualify as ministers for First
Amendment purposes under the Court’s possibly very inclusive criteria. At its first
opportunity, the Court must clarify that the First Amendment does not incentivize reli-
gious institutions to turn a blind eye to the tortious behavior of their employees. Else,
the health and well-being of innocent victims, society, and religious institutions
themselves are almost guaranteed to decline.
